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Abstract. Organizations, particularly those for whom safety and reliability are crucial,
develop routines to protect them from failure. But even highly reliable organizations
are not immune to disaster and prolonged periods of safe operation are punctuated by
occasional catastrophes. Scholars of safety science label this the “paradox of almost totally
safe systems,” noting that systems that are very safe under normal conditions may be
vulnerable under unusual ones. In this paper, we explain, develop, and apply the concept
of “organizational limits” to this puzzle through an analysis of the loss of Air France 447.
We show that an initial, relatively minor limit violation set in train a cascade of human
and technological limit violations, with catastrophic consequences. Focusing on cockpit
automation, we argue that the same measures that make a system safe and predictable
may introduce restrictions on cognition, which over time, inhibit or erode the disturbance-
handling capability of the actors involved. We also note limits to cognition in system
design processes that make it difficult to foresee complex interactions. We discuss the
implications of our findings for predictability and control in contexts beyond aviation and
ways in which these problems might be addressed.
Open Access Statement: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0
International License. You are free to download this work and share with others for any pur-
pose, even commercially if you distribute your contributions under the same license as the orig-
inal, and you must attribute this work as “Organization Science. Copyright 2017 The Author(s).
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2017.1138, used under a Creative Commons Attribution License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses /by-sa/4.0/.”
Keywords: managerial and organizational cognition • interpretation and sense making • decision making • complex systems analysis •
ambidextrous organizations
Things that have never happened before happen all the
time. (Sagan 1995)
Errors and failures are troublesome for organiza-
tions. They can cause tragic accidents, destroy value,
waste resources, and damage reputations (Coombs
2007, Yu et al. 2008). Many organizations therefore go
to great lengths to avoid failure, particularly when the
consequences are severe, and some “high reliability
organizations” are able to achieve remarkably error-
free operation even in the face of challenging condi-
tions (Roberts 1990, Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, Weick
et al. 1999). However, scholars of safety science have
observed that accident rates in “ultra-safe” systems
(such as commercial aviation and nuclear power) seem
to be asymptotic at around five disastrous accidents
per 10−7 safety units of the system (Amalberti 2001).
Thus, even safety-critical organizations appear to find
it difficult to eliminate all failures, apparently sup-
porting the argument that accidents are inevitable in
complex, tightly coupled systems (Leveson et al. 2009,
Perrow 1984).
In this paper we explore this problem, drawing on
Farjoun and Starbuck’s concept of organizational lim-
its (Farjoun and Starbuck 2007, Starbuck and Farjoun
2005). We focus on commercial aviation because it rep-
resents an almost totally safe system that both con-
fronts and constructs limits of many types, from those
inherent to the physics of flight, to regulations, oper-
ating routines, and many parameters of aircraft and
system design. Aviation provides a rich environment
inwhich to study limits because limit violations are rel-
atively tangible and visible and detailed data on these
violations are publicly available (Syed 2015).
We develop the concept of limits and discuss the
causes and consequences of limit violations through
analysis of Air France flight 447 (AF447), which was
lost when a temporary loss of speed indications unex-
pectedly caused theautopilot todisconnect. In respond-
ing to this, one of the pilots caused an aerodynamic
stall, from which the crew were unable to recover.
We examine how cockpit automation places limits on
pilot experience and we explore the consequences of
this. AF447 shows how a system normally capable of
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operating to very high standards of safety and pre-
dictability can rapidly spiral out of control when faced
with an unusual situation. We discuss the implications
of a limits analysis for issues of predictability, con-
trol, and adaptability in organizations more generally
(Farjoun 2010).
AF447 is classified as a “loss of control” incident.
Loss of control is currently the single greatest cause
of casualties in commercial aviation. It accounted for
nearly 1,400 fatalities in 15 fatal air accidents between
2006 and 2015 according to Boeing (2016) and 37 fatal
accidents and 1,242 fatalities (43% of all fatalities)
between 2010 and 2014 according to analysis by IATA
(2015). Most types of aviation accidents have declined
over time, but loss of control incidents have not (IATA
2015). Intriguingly, the loss of control problem has
been attributed to some of the very same measures,
such as sophisticated cockpit automation, that have
also reduced accidents (Harris 2011, 2014; Learmount
2011; Rochlin 1997).
We consider AF447, and loss of control incidents
more generally, as extreme examples of failure in a very
safe system that normally operates well within its lim-
its. In doing this, we seek to contribute to knowledge
in three distinct ways. First, we discuss limits concepts,
drawing on the work of Farjoun, Starbuck, and col-
leagues. Second, we use limits concepts to interpret the
events that led to the loss of AF447 and in doing this
seek to theorize the paradox of almost totally safe sys-
tems more deeply. Finally, we discuss the implications
of a limits perspective for organization science more
generally, in particular how organizational strategies
geared to predictability and control interact with those
required to handle uncertainty (Farjoun 2010).
From a limits perspective, failures occur when orga-
nizations attempt to do things that are beyond their
capabilities. The concept emerged from analysis of
the loss of the space shuttle Columbia, which con-
cluded that a cause of the disaster was that NASA
had “pushed or been pushed to the limit of what an
organization can accomplish” (Starbuck and Farjoun
2005, p. 360; emphasis added). In this case, the limit
that NASA exceeded was its ability to meet multi-
ple demands while operating the space shuttle safely.
A limits perspective is thus implicitly a stress model
in which demands exceed coping capabilities (Karasek
1979, Lazarus and Folkman 1984). In the run up to
the Columbia disaster, NASAwas being judged against
no fewer than 211 performance targets (Starbuck and
Stephenson 2005). Over many years, pressures to
secure legitimacy and funding had led NASA to over-
promise and to oversell the reliability of its technol-
ogy (Boin and Schulman 2008). One manifestation
of this was to portray the shuttle as an operational,
rather than as an experimental vehicle, resulting in
schedule pressures that intensified after NASA made
a public commitment that the core of the Interna-
tional Space Station would be complete by February
2004. Yet the reality was that NASA was not dealing
with “settled knowledge” (Boin and Schulman 2008)
but with complex, unreliable technologies, operating
under extreme conditions, requiring “real-life exper-
imentation at the edges of knowledge” (Farjoun and
Starbuck 2007, p. 556). Thismeant thatwith every flight
there were many issues and anomalies to be resolved.
Schedule pressures and other demands therefore
severely tested NASA’s capability to meet them. A cul-
ture and vocabulary developed that privileged sched-
ule over safety (Haunschild et al. 2015) and that was
“not hospitable” to discussions of risk and uncer-
tainty (Ocasio 2005, p. 118), along with a subtle shap-
ing of collective cognition that encouraged significant
anomalies to be treated as “in-family” events, thereby
normalizing deviance (Vaughan 1997). Consequently,
the crucial foam strike was classified as a maintenance
issue to be addressed once the orbiter had returned to
Earth and not as a potential safety issue that required
immediate investigation. The engineerswhoweremost
concerned about the foam strike struggled to get their
voices heard by mission management. The result was
“structurally induced blindness” (Ocasio 2011) toward
certain issues:
There was coordination within an organizational level
but not between levels. As a result, abstractions that
made sense within levels were senseless between levels.
Abstractions favored within the top management level
prevailed. Abstractions of the engineers were ignored.
(Weick 2005, p. 165)
Thus, the overall “limit” that NASA exceeded was
its ability to fly the shuttle safely in the face of multi-
ple external demands and a highly ambitious launch
schedule, while deploying complex, unreliable tech-
nologies “at the frontier.” Organizationally, NASA
exceeded the limit of its ability to identify, interpret,
communicate, and act upon information about the
foam strike while simultaneously attending to other
demands.
Organizational Limits
The limits concept was subsequently defined by
Farjoun and Starbuck as follows:
All organizations have limits in the range, amount,
duration, and quality of things they can do with their
current capabilities, and these limits may originate in
their members’ perceptions, in their policies, in the tech-
nologies they adopt, or in their environments.
(Farjoun and Starbuck 2007, p. 543)
This conception goes beyond the stress model
implicit in the Columbia analysis because it identifies
a number of limiting factors that together restrict the
overall ability of an organization to meet the demands
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made upon it. Farjoun and Starbuck single out three
such factors: cognition, management policies, and con-
straints in the environment.
Limits to cognition are significant because they con-
strain the ability of actors to recognize, interpret, and
respond appropriately to events. Cognition figures
extensively in various analyses of Columbia (Dunbar
and Garud 2009, Garud et al. 2011, Weick 2005) and of
course also underpins much of the literature on sense-
making and catastrophe (Weick 1993, 2010). Yet lim-
its to cognition are not a given. Some organizations
find ways to create valid, sophisticated, shared mental
models, even in complex and dynamic operating envi-
ronments, thereby extending the limits within which
they can operate predictably and safely (Roberts and
Rousseau 1989, Weick and Roberts 1993, Weick and
Sutcliffe 2007). Others struggle to do so (Farjoun
and Starbuck 2007). Conceptually, cognitive limits are
rooted in constraints in the capacity of human beings
to pay attention to many things at once while pro-
cessing and sharing information, constraints that have
long been recognized by scholars of decision making
(March and Simon 1958, Ocasio 1997, Simon 1972).
The second category of limits identified by Far-
joun and Starbuck emerges from a managerial quest
for coordination and control. Examples of such limits
include deadlines, budgets, and organizational poli-
cies. Deadlines and budgets are mechanisms to con-
trol resources and to coordinate interdependent activ-
ities by establishing limits within which actors are
expected to work. Such limits are an integral part of the
apparatus of organizational control, providing some
predictability of outcome without constant monitor-
ing and/or detailed specification of inputs. They also
reduce the risk of managerial overload (Ashby 1958,
Child 1984, Galbraith 1974). Limits therefore underpin
many fundamental organizational processes:
All of the concepts onwhich organizations rely—such as
order, purpose, choice, power, conflict, division of labor,
coordination, trust, reliability, and accountability—
require or assume limits of some sort.
(Farjoun and Starbuck 2007, p. 545)
Cognition-based and managerially induced limits
share some common features. Both recognize lim-
ited capacity for attention and information process-
ing. From the cognitive perspective, a crucial limiting
factor of what an organization can do is determined
by the ability of its members to make sense of what
is happening around them; transgression of this limit
is likely to lead to failure. Managerially defined lim-
its typically serve to either focus attention (controlling
time or cost, or limiting task variety, for example) or
provide a framework within which decisions can be
devolved to lower levels, thereby reducing monitoring
and information-processing costs (Galbraith 1974).
The first two categories of limits are endogenous
to most organizations because they stem from aspects
of organizational cognition, structure, and process
that contribute to (or impede) an organization’s abil-
ity to meet demands. The third category of limits is
exogenous, in that the limits originate in the orga-
nization’s environment. Examples include societally
defined restrictions that may be expressed through
laws or regulations, or market mechanisms that penal-
ize organizations that fail to match the price, quality,
and service levels of their competitors. Laws of science
that constrain what is physically or technically possible
represent particularly immutable exogenous limits.
In this paper we will use endogenous limits to refer
to the limits of what an organization is able to do,
with reasonable consistency and reliability, given its
characteristics and capabilities. Capabilities stem from
the resources available to an organization (e.g., skills,
knowledge, and experience) coupled with its ability
to mobilize and apply these resources toward appro-
priately scoped and prioritized goals. We use exoge-
nous limits to refer to restrictions on organizational
action that emanate from the environment in which
an organization operates. The nature of these can vary,
from constraints based on physical laws (e.g., ther-
modynamics or gravity) to socially constructed limits
(e.g., legislation, regulations, and norms about what is
acceptable or desirable). The key point is that the limits
to what an organization can do are partly endogenous
(limited by its capabilities) and partly exogenous, lim-
ited by what social and physical features of its environ-
ment permit.
The distinction between endogenous and exoge-
nous limits raises an important question: Endoge-
nous or exogenous to what? In various analyses of the
Columbia disaster, the focus is on NASA as an organi-
zation. Therefore “endogenous” limits stem from fac-
tors within NASA as an organization and “exogenous”
ones from NASA’s environment. But as one moves
between levels of aggregation, a feature that is a source
of capability and is therefore endogenous at one level
may represent an exogenous limit at another. For exam-
ple, for a project team a budget or deadline repre-
sents an exogenous limit. For the organization within
which the project team is located, budgets and dead-
lines are tools to facilitate coordination and the control
of cost and time, thereby influencing the organization’s
endogenous limits.
This distinction is particularly significant for the
relationship between technology and limits, which we
review in the next section, because technology can rep-
resent both an endogenous and an exogenous limit.
When technology contributes to a capacity to do things
(e.g., through data storage and processing power) it is
endogenous to the entity that is using it. When technol-
ogy serves as a constraint on those who interact with it
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(e.g., by prescribing their sequence of actions) it func-
tions as an exogenous limit. This may be intentional
(e.g., when operators are prevented from advancing
through a data entry process unless valid values have
been entered) or it may be a side effect of the pursuit of
other priorities, such as cost or simplicity, which render
the technology incapable of certain functions.
Limits, Technology, and Aviation
In aviation, technology, in particular cockpit automa-
tion, has attracted attention ever since the “glass cock-
pit” revolution began to change the work of pilots on
the flight deck (Rochlin 1997). The “glass cockpit” orig-
inally referred to the replacement of electromechanical
dials and gauges with computer-generated panel dis-
plays (Rochlin 1997), but the term also describes an
ensemble of technologies that process and present data
to pilots, manage the relationship between pilot input
and aircraft response (“fly-by-wire” technologies), and
fly the plane automatically. In a glass cockpit, pilots
spend much of their time monitoring and managing,
rather than manually flying, their aircraft.
Glass cockpit technology has contributed signifi-
cantly to the decline in aviation accidents in recent
decades (Carr 2015, Grose 1988, Harris 2011). However,
there are concerns that it erodes situational aware-
ness, with pilots sometimes unsure about what the
technology is doing (Harris 2011, Learmount 2011,
Young et al. 2006). Long haul pilots in particular typi-
cally spend very little time actually flying their planes,
something that can adversely affect their ability to han-
dle unusual, demanding situations (Adams et al. 1995,
Endsley 1996, Learmount 2011).
Viewed through a limits lens, cockpit automation
affects both the exogenous and endogenous limits
experienced by a flight crew. First, automation inter-
venes to prevent dangerous maneuvers, thereby acting
as a protective, exogenous limit that insulates pilots
from the consequences of their actions but in doing
so it restricts pilots’ repertoires of behavior and expe-
rience (Learmount 2011). The sudden loss of exoge-
nous limits previously provided by technology can
quickly thrust a crew into a zone from which it was
previously excluded, with only limited time to answer
fundamental questions such as “What is this tech-
nology doing?” and “What will it do next?” (Sarter
et al. 1997, Weick et al. 1999). Automation surprises,
where the technology malfunctions or fails to func-
tion as expected, pose a particular problem (Sarter
et al. 1997, Weiner 1989). Second, automation reduces
the cognitive load of pilots, who are relieved of the
burden of scanning multiple instruments, processing
information, and flying the plane manually, thereby
reducing the risk of overload-related errors. Third,
it may subtly erode pilots’ capabilities (Learmount
2011, Weick 1990a). Finally, there is a risk that under
unusual conditions, automation may give ambiguous
or inappropriate signals, which in turn precipitate and
aggravate errors (Bainbridge 1983, Parasuraman and
Wickens 2008, Rouse et al. 1987).
In the field of safety science, many of these issues
are expressed in the “paradox of almost totally safe
systems” (Amalberti 2001, Reason 2000b). This para-
dox recognizes that most systems need to stay within
certain limits for safe operation. Designers and con-
trollers therefore construct procedures, checks, and
controls—including technology-based ones—to ensure
that these limits are not transgressed. For operators,
such as pilots, such measures constitute exogenous
limits on their actions. However, they also have the
side effect of reducing operators’ “cognitive experi-
ence of the system and jumble [. . .] meta-knowledge,
confidence, and protective signals when approach-
ing boundaries” (Amalberti 1998, p. 9). Continuous
operation well within limits does not stimulate chal-
lenge and enquiry and therefore can undermine sit-
uational awareness and mindfulness (Amalberti 1998,
2001; Reason 2000b, 1997; Roe and Schulman 2008).
This erosion is most likely to be revealed in unfa-
miliar or unexpected circumstances that function as
“brutal audits” of the coping ability of those involved
(Amalberti 2001, Dismukes et al. 2007, Farjoun 2010,
Reason 2000b, Richardson 1995, Sastry 1997, Weick
and Sutcliffe 2007). Hence the paradox—safe, pre-
dictable, error-free operation under normal conditions
may come at the expense of reduced capability to
deal with abnormal conditions. Or, in limits terms, the
reduced risk of errors due to exogenous limits imposed
by system design may have a detrimental effect on the
endogenous limits of the actors concerned.
Contribution of a Limits Perspective
The various types of limit that we have discussed
map onto a number of established bodies of research.
Cognition-based limits recognize the limits of atten-
tion and their significance for decision making (March
and Simon 1958, Ocasio 2011, Simon 1972), an issue
also relevant to sensemaking (Weick 1993, 2005, 2010),
high-reliability theory (Roe and Schulman 2008, Weick
and Roberts 1993, Weick and Sutcliffe 2007), and orga-
nizational mindfulness (Sutcliffe et al. 2016,Weick et al.
1999). All of these areas address issues of social cog-
nition and the ability of actors to perceive, interpret,
share, and act appropriately when faced with infor-
mation that is complex and ambiguous. A limits per-
spective invokes cognition as one of the critical limit-
ing factors of an organization’s repertoire of responses
to the demands that it faces. Managerially induced
limits are based on notions of coordination and con-
trol, in which limits serve as boundary conditions for
behavior (for instance through rules and policies) and
resource consumption (such as deadlines and budgets)
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
29
.21
5.1
9.3
8]
 on
 12
 Ju
ne
 20
17
, a
t 0
2:3
1 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Oliver, Calvard, and Potočnik: Lessons from the Air France 447 Disaster
Organization Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–15, ©2017 The Author(s) 5
delivering some control while regulating variety and
information-processing load (Beer 1981, Child 1984,
Galbraith 1974, Lawrence and Lorsch 1986). A limits
perspective draws attention to some of the negative
and unintended consequences of such limits (Starbuck
2009). But what does the perspective add to what are
already well-established concepts about how organi-
zations work or fail to work? The answer, according
to one commentator, is that “perceptions of organiza-
tional failure . . .become more meaningful when they
are linked to concepts such as limits” (Weick 2016, p. 5).
We concur with this view and suggest that the
value of a limits perspective is fourfold. First, a limits
perspective considers combinations of organizational
processes that may otherwise be treated in isolation—
such as cognition, communication, decision making—
and relates these to an organization’s capacity to deal
with the demands it faces and to the consequences of
its inability to meet these demands. Second, a limits
perspective prompts questions such as “What factors
limit the capacity of this organization to perform?” and
“What are the consequences of exceeding this capac-
ity?” Third, the idea that organizations have limits
that can be exceeded alerts us to the risk of “over-
reach,” leading to outcomes that are unpredictable
and in many cases undesirable. Finally, the distinc-
tion between endogenous and exogenous limits draws
attention to the constraining effects of both organiza-
tional capabilities and factors in the environment.
Methods
Limits research faces several challenges. Limits can
be difficult to observe and define and are not always
visible or are only visible for short periods (Farjoun
and Starbuck 2007). Some limits are only revealed
by violations that often carry negative consequences,
so that those involved may be reticent to be subjects
of research. There may be posthoc reconstructions of
events in order to deflect responsibility. Events that are
subject to detailed, forensic public inquiry are therefore
promising candidates for limits analysis and indeed
are often studied as organizational failures (Starbuck
and Farjoun 2005; Weick 1990b, 1993, 2010). Official
reports may be shaped by political and other forces
(Brown 2000), but safety-critical activities are perhaps
less susceptible to this problem.
Aviation is therefore well suited to limits research.
A great deal of information is collected as part of nor-
mal operations. Flight data and cockpit voice recorders
(“black boxes”) record pilot conversations and actions
and aircraft behavior. Aviation personnel are encour-
aged to report errors and anomalies, including those
that do not result in accidents, so that safety can be
improved (Dekker 2012, Reason 2000a, Syed 2015). The
details of accident investigations are widely available.
Our analysis of AF447 is based on two main sources:
the official report on the accident by the French air
accident investigation agency (BEA 2012), and an addi-
tional analysis by an Airbus 330 pilot (Palmer 2013).
The official report includes the transcript of the cock-
pit voice recorder (CVR) for the final two hours of the
flight and readouts from the flight data recorder (FDR).
The FDR provides information on the status of many
aircraft parameters for the last 40 minutes of the flight.
Palmer is anAirbus 330 pilot with amajor international
airline. He is lead author and editor for the airline’s
A330 systems manual and of numerous A330 training
publications. His book provides background informa-
tion on the aircraft involved and on operational and
other procedures not explained in the official report.
Palmer also provides extensive interpretation of much
technical information in the official report.
Because of its dramatic nature, there have been
many accounts and analyses of the accident, such that
a Google search using the search term “Air France
447” in February 2017 produced nearly 900,000 hits.
The aircraft was out of radar contact when it disap-
peared, there was no distress call and no survivors,
so there was relatively little information for investiga-
tors to work with until the wreckage of the aircraft
was located in 4,000 meters of water and the cockpit
voice and flight data recorders recovered, some two
years after the crash. Therefore, virtually all accounts
are based on the same source material from the offi-
cial report and its associated documents. We reviewed
many accounts of the accident but it quickly became
clear that many of these introduced errors and embel-
lishments to the original data or omitted important
items of information. We therefore restricted ourselves
to data that appeared in the official report and its asso-
ciated documents, supplemented by Palmer’s book
because of the specialist additional information that it
provided.
To compile our data set, we first extracted four
streams of information from the official report and
Palmer’s book. These were (1) the transcript of the
CVR, (2) the data from the FDR, (3) the commentary
and analysis in the official report, and (4) key points
from Palmer’s account of the incident. A master data
table was created and verbatim extracts from each
source were placed in one of four columns (CVR, FDR,
Official Report, Palmer) in approximate chronological
order from the start of the flight up to the crash. This
was necessary to establish the precise flow of events,
as neither the official report nor Palmer presented all
relevant data in exact chronological order. Two further
columns were then added. The first contained the pre-
cise times at which various events occurred. Each block
of time was assigned a unique row. The second col-
umn tracked the altitude of the aircraft and how this
changed over time. The material was then sequenced
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
29
.21
5.1
9.3
8]
 on
 12
 Ju
ne
 20
17
, a
t 0
2:3
1 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Oliver, Calvard, and Potočnik: Lessons from the Air France 447 Disaster
6 Organization Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–15, ©2017 The Author(s)
into precise chronological order. There were a num-
ber of points at which several things were happening
simultaneously or in quick succession; particular atten-
tion was paid to these sequences. This process created
a document that ran to 26 A3 pages and comprised
over 23,000 words, in six columns and 118 rows.
The transcript from the CVR provided data on
how the pilots interacted with each other, how they
responded to events, and clues as to their cognition
and comprehension as events progressed. The voice
recorder also picked up sounds that helped build up
a picture of what was happening on the flight deck
(such as ice particles hitting the fuselage at the start
of the incident) and aural warnings emitted by the
aircraft instruments (for example, the stall warning,
which sounded repeatedly during the final minutes of
the flight). The FDR provided information about the
status and behavior of the aircraft and the inputs made
by the pilots.
The three authors independently reviewed the data
document, noting conditions, events, and actions rel-
evant to limits and limit violations. This produced a
long list of elements, many of which were interdepen-
dent (e.g., pilot actions, aircraft response, instrument
readings, and aircraft parameters). Individual judg-
ments were compared and discussed until consensus
on each was achieved and then aggregated to produce
an agreed set of limits issues.
The timeline was then divided into three distinct
phases. The first covered the period of approximately
two hours leading up to the disconnection of the auto-
pilot. This phase represents a baseline of normality,
before any significant limit violations occurred. The
second phase lasted from the disconnection up until
when the aircraft stalled. In this phase the crew was
beyond limits of their experience and struggling to
respond, but the situation was not totally out of con-
trol. The final phase was from the stall to the end of
the flight.
One of the shocking features of the AF447 story is
that apart from the short, transitory loss of airspeed
indications, there were no technical faults with the air-
craft. It was a modern aircraft, operated by a reputable
airline with a good safety record, flown by an experi-
enced, well-trained crew. The information necessary to
diagnose the situation was available to the crew and
the situation was probably recoverable up until the last
minute or so of flight.
The Loss of AF447
Flight AF447 crashed into the Atlantic on June 1, 2009,
on a night flight from Rio to Paris. While crossing
the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), an area
renowned for bad weather, the aircraft entered a trop-
ical storm. Its speed indications briefly became invalid
because of icing of the aircraft’s pitot tubes, part of the
system that measures the aircraft’s forward airspeed.
This caused the autopilot to disconnect, requiring the
pilots to takemanual control. The responses of the pilot
who took control caused the aircraft to leave its safe
flight envelope, resulting in an aerodynamic stall. The
crew were unable to diagnose what was happening to
the rapidly descending aircraft until it was too late to
recover and AF447 crashed into the sea with the loss of
all 228 passengers and crew. The entire episode, from
disconnection of the autopilot to impact, lasted 4 min-
utes and 23 seconds.
Phase One—From Departure to the Loss of
Speed Indications
There were three members of flight crew on AF447:
CaptainMarc Dubois (aged 58, 10,988 flight hours) and
two first officers, David Robert (aged 37, 6,547 flight
hours) and Pierre-Cedric Bonin (aged 32, 2,936 flight
hours). The captain and two first officers had flown
16, 39, and 5 return trips between Europe and South
America, respectively.
AF447 left Rio at 22:29 UTC. The first three hours of
the flight were unremarkable and Robert spent much
of this time in the crew rest area. The aircraft climbed to
its initial cruise altitude of 35,000 feet and on the flight
deck the dialogue between Dubois and Bonin was
relaxed and routine, punctuated by occasional calls to
and from air traffic control. At about 00:30 the crew
received information about a convective zone ahead
of them, but took no action. Most other flights in the
area that night made diversions to avoid the worst of
the weather system. At 01:35 Bonin remarked “We’ve
got a thing straight ahead” and the FDR showed that
both he and Dubois made adjustments to their weather
radar displays. Bonin expressed a wish to climb to
try to avoid the weather and raised this possibility a
number of times. He and Dubois discussed this and
concluded that a climb was not possible because of
the relatively high air temperature and aircraft’s fuel
load. The instruments advised a maximum altitude of
37,500 feet, which Dubois and Bonin acknowledged.
The official report notes that Bonin showed “a real
preoccupation [with crossing the ITCZ], beyond the
simple awareness of an operational risk. Some anxiety
was noticeable in his insistence” (BEA 2012, p. 168).
The report describes Dubois as “very unresponsive”
to Bonin’s concerns, “vaguely rejecting” Bonin’s sug-
gestions to climb, but not providing a clear decision,
instructions, or recommendations for dealing with the
weather conditions (BEA 2012, p. 168). Dubois’ posi-
tion is revealed by his remark “We’ll wait a little (and
see if) that goes away,” which, given that he was about
to leave the cockpit for his break, meant that any deci-
sions contingent on the weather were delegated to his
junior colleagues.
At 01:56 Dubois called Robert back to the flight deck.
Bonin, the most junior officer and least experienced
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member of the crew, was designated as the pilot flying
the aircraft. The handover itself was quite casual:
Dubois: [Speaking to Bonin] Who’s doing the landing, is it
you? Well, right, he [Robert] is going to take my
place . . .You’re a PL [Officier Pilote de Ligne]
aren’t you?
Bonin: Yeah.
The casualness of Dubois’ handover may have cre-
ated ambiguity in the control structure among the two
first officers, one manifestation of which was Robert’s
use of the left (captain’s) seat rather than the right seat,
as was customary for the pilot not flying. Later analy-
sis of the pilots’ seats also revealed that when Robert
took the seat vacated by Dubois, he left it well back on
its rails, good for comfort, but not ideal for flying the
aircraft.
About eight minutes after Dubois left for his break,
Robert increased the sensitivity of the weather radar
and suggested an adjustment to the course to avoid the
worst of theweather system ahead. Bonin executed this
and asked about a strange odor in the cockpit; Robert
replied that it was ozone and explained what caused
it. The official report comments as follows:
A natural assertion of authority by the PNF [pilot not
flying—Robert] is then observable: he seemed to master
the environmental context better (ozone) and suggested,
even asserted, the avoidance strategy. The PF [pilot
flying—Bonin] did not resist this tendency. Without this
leading to the slightest conflict, after the autopilot dis-
connection, it rapidly led to the inversion of the normal
hierarchical structure in the cockpit, with leadership
passing to the PNF in the left seat without the role of
command being formally and explicitly transferred.
(BEA 2012, p. 170)
Up to this point, apart from the weather system
in the path of AF447, the situation appeared normal
and certainly seemed to be viewed as such by Dubois.
Bonin exhibited anxiety; events were to prove that
this was with good reason. AF447’s failure to make
a timely diversion around the storm did not violate
any limits per se, but increased the probability that the
crew would face difficult and challenging conditions;
in other words, the limits of their capabilities were
more likely to be tested. Themaximum safe altitude for
AF447 was 37,500 feet—an exogenous limit that ruled
out climbing above the weather system, narrowing the
crew’s options.
Several conditions, each minor in itself, now com-
bined to compromise the crew’s ability to deal with the
situation that lay ahead. The least experiencedmember
of the crew, already anxious about the weather sys-
tem, was designated as relief captain. The casual han-
dover of command by Dubois created ambiguity in the
authority structure on the flight deck, subtly reinforced
by the seating layout. Dubois’ decision to take his break
reduced cognitive resources on the flight deck just as
AF447 entered the storm.Without realizing it, the crew
had suffered a significant diminution in capability and
at the same time had increased the risk of substan-
tial workload, hence shifting the demands-capability
balance. The margins of safety narrowed as the crew
moved closer to key endogenous and exogenous limits.
Phase Two—From the Loss of Speed
Indications to the Stall
The phase from the icing of the pitot tubes until the
stall lasted only about oneminute, but a great deal hap-
pened during this brief period. Shortly after Robert and
Bonin adjusted course, the CVR recorded the sound
of ice crystals against the fuselage. These temporar-
ily blocked the three pitot tubes that are part of the
system that calculates the forward airspeed of the air-
craft. The readings produced by the pitots are used
by the electronic flight control system, which is pro-
grammed to disengage when these readings are incon-
sistent. The automatic pilot, which was controlling
parameters such as thrust, altitude, attitude, and roll
disconnected, requiring the pilots to take manual con-
trol. Pilots rarely fly manually at high altitude because
the safe flight envelope is small and even modest pilot
inputs produce significant responses from the aircraft.
(The safe flight envelope refers to the combination of
conditions necessary for an aircraft to remain in flight,
the edges of which are defined primarily by airspeed,
angle of attack, and air density.) The aircraft’s flight
control system switched from “normal” to “alternate”
law, disabling the protections that automatically pre-
vent excursion from the safe flight envelope.
Several limit violations occurred at this point. The
first was that the volume and density of ice particles
temporarily exceeded the capacity of the pitot tube
heaters to clear them, blocking the tubes. The electronic
flight control system disconnected, exactly as it was
designed to do when faced with unreliable data, so the
pilots were forced to hand fly at high altitude, a situ-
ation outside their normal experience. The pilots thus
abruptly found themselves beyond their endogenous
limits, facing an unforgiving exogenous limit in the
form of the very restricted flight envelope and without
the usual automatic protection against inappropriate
actions. The situationwas not yet a crisis—the only real
issues were that the speed readings were inconsistent
and that the flight path had to bemaintainedmanually.
Bonin took control of the aircraft using his sidestick,
calling out “I have the controls.” He attempted to cor-
rect a slight roll to the right, but overcompensated,
causing the aircraft to roll left. He overcorrected again
and the aircraft rolled left and right 10 times in 30 sec-
onds. In addition to lateral stick movements to try to
control the roll, Bonin also pulled back on his stick,
putting the aircraft into a climb, possibly in response to
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an erroneous indication of slight loss of altitude when
the pitot tubes blocked. The aircraft rapidly gained alti-
tude while losing airspeed.
The appropriate response to autopilot disconnection
is for pilots to touch as little as possible and to keep
the aircraft flying straight and level while they try to
understand the situation (BEA 2012). A postaccident
simulation demonstrated that without Bonin’s inputs
the plane would have gradually rolled further to the
right but attitude and altitude would have remained
stable. There was no immediate risk to the aircraft until
Bonin’s inputs began to move it toward the edge of the
safe flight envelope.
As the aircraft pitched up in response to Bonin’s
initial nose-up input, the stall warning (a synthetic
voice announcing “stall, stall”) sounded three times.
Within 10 seconds of the disconnection, both pilots had
recognized that there was an issue with the airspeed
indications:
Bonin: We haven’t got a good . . . .
Bonin: We haven’t got a good display . . .of speed.
Robert: We’ve lost the the the speeds so . . . [reading out
ECAM1 messages] engine thrust A T H R engine
lever thrust.
Robert: [continuing to read the ECAM]1 . . . alternate law
protections- (law/low/lo2).
Bonin: Engine lever?
Robert: Watch your speed, watch your speed.
Bonin: Okay, okay, okay I’m going back down.
Robert: Stabilise.
Bonin: Yeah.
Robert: Go back down. According to that we’re going up.
According to all three you’re going up so go back
down.
Bonin: Okay.
Robert: You’re at [. . .] go back down.
Bonin: It’s going, we’re going (back) down.
Bonin was quite possibly unaware that flight enve-
lope protection had been withdrawn and Robert’s dis-
organized reading of the ECAM messages did little to
correct this. So just as the startled crew confronted an
unfamiliar situation that tested their endogenous lim-
its, many of the protective exogenous limits bestowed
by the electronic flight control systemhaddisappeared.
Although struggling to assimilate what was happen-
ing, both pilots, particularly Robert, had some grasp of
the situation. Both showed awareness of the inconsis-
tent airspeed readings and Robert recognized the risk
posed by altitude gain and loss of airspeed. Yet despite
Robert’s warnings, Bonin continued to pull back on
his sidestick and within about a minute AF447 had
climbed to nearly 38,000 feet, violating the safe altitude
limit that Bonin and Dubois had discussed less than
20 minutes earlier. Bonin’s actions were invisible to
Robert because on Airbus aircraft each pilot has a side-
stick tomanually control the plane, located on opposite
sides of the aircraft. The sidestick inputs of one pilot
are therefore not apparent to the other. If pilots make
conflicting sidestick inputs these are averaged by the
system, awarningmessage is displayed and a synthetic
voice calls out “dual input.”
Robert’s attention was initially split between moni-
toring the flight path, giving instructions to Bonin, and
reading and interpreting the messages on the ECAM.
It appears that Robert quickly concluded that the situ-
ation was beyond his capacity to resolve and his prior-
ity became recalling Dubois to the flight deck. Robert
made at least six calls to the crew rest area within about
30 seconds (approximately 50–80 seconds after discon-
nection). By 02:11:07 (one minute three seconds after
disconnection) the icing had cleared and airspeed indi-
cations were valid once more. However, the climb had
wiped nearly 90 knots off the indicated airspeed, so
the pilots may not have believed the now-valid speed
readings.
In limits terms, several things happened during
this phase, with one limit violation triggering a cas-
cade of additional human, technological, and physical
limit violations. The initial limit violation was techno-
logical—the capacity of the heating elements to keep
the pitot tubes clear was exceeded. However, ice inges-
tion was a known issue that had been under investi-
gation for nearly a year before the loss of AF447. We
revisit this issue in the discussion, as it reveals both
how actual limits may be established and the difficulty
of ascertaining exactly where they lie.
Other limit violations quickly followed. The discon-
nection of the autopilot and the reversion to alternate
law are purposefully designed responses to inconsis-
tencies in input data to the flight control system. The
role of the pilots in this situation is essentially that of
“disturbance handlers” (Mintzberg 1989) who apply
human judgment to resolve the situation. The AF447
pilots appear to have been so caught by surprise that
they were momentarily pushed beyond the limits of
their ability to handle this disturbance. As they strug-
gled to understandwhatwas happening, Bonin rapidly
and unwittingly took the plane toward the edge of its
safe flight envelope, possibly unaware that there was
now no protection against a stall. The official report
suggests that this, along with aural saturation and
mental overload, may be why the pilots never acknowl-
edged the stall warning, which called out “stall” a total
of 75 times. Under normal flight law a stall is virtu-
ally impossible, so the pilots may have been unable to
absorb or believe the synthetic voice telling them that
thiswas indeedwhatwas happening. If so, this demon-
strates how limits constrain cognition and perceptions
of plausibility, thereby impeding problem recognition
and resolution.
Robert, who initially had a better grasp of the fun-
damentals, was soon overwhelmed as Bonin’s actions
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rapidly aggravated the situation. The crew’s collec-
tive cognition, expressed and supported by an abil-
ity to coordinate and cross-check tasks and readings,
processes inherent to effective crew resource manage-
ment, collapsed and never recovered. In effect, a cas-
cade of limit violations occurred. The ice ingestion led
to the withdrawal of flight protections and the autopi-
lot, which in turn thrust the pilots, Bonin in particu-
lar, into a situation that was outside the limits of their
normal experience. The crew’s ability to pool cognitive
resources, which could have offered a route to recov-
ery, broke down in the face of ill-preparedness and a
strong startle effect. Their increasingly uncoordinated
actions rapidly propelled the situation toward a full
blown crisis.
Phase Three—From the Stall to the
End of the Flight
While Robert was trying to recall Dubois to the cock-
pit, the aircraft reached its peak altitude of 37,924 feet
and exited the flight envelope—a violation of a crucial
exogenous limit. In the seconds that preceded the stall,
the stall warning began to sound in the cockpit and
the CVR recorded vibrations, most probably the onset
of stall buffet. Neither Bonin nor Robert acknowledged
the stall warning or buffet.
After the autopilot disconnection the main task for
the pilots had been to stabilize the flight path while
they diagnosed what was happening and worked out
a plan of action. Pilot training for stalls emphasizes
recognition of approach to a stall and stall avoidance. It
does not include an actual stall and recovery from this.
Once AF447 stalled, the situation changed very dra-
matically. Further limit violations quickly ensued and
a pressing new limit, time, entered the picture. The air-
craft was in free fall, falling at 10–15,000 feet a minute.
The crew had only around three and a half minutes
until the aircraft reached the ocean, a very small recov-
ery window. “At this point, only descent of the aero-
plane through a nose-down input on the sidestick
would have made it possible to bring the aeroplane
back within the flight envelope” (BEA 2012, p. 179).
However, neither Bonin nor Robert recognized that
the aircraft was stalled. They were therefore strug-
gling to understand what was happening, let alone
take appropriate corrective action. Their bewilderment
is clear from the CVR, approximately a minute and a
half into the episode:
Robert: But we’ve got the engines, what’s happening (. . .)?
Do you understand what’s happening or not?
Bonin: (. . .) I don’t have control of the airplane any more
now. I don’t have control of the airplane at all.
Robert: Controls to the left (. . . .) what is that?
Bonin: I have the impression (we have) the speed.
Dubois: [Noise of cockpit door opening] Er, what are you
(doing)?
Robert: What’s happening? I don’t know, I don’t know
what’s happening.
Bonin: We’re losing control of the aeroplane there.
Robert: We lost all control of the aeroplane, we don’t
understand anything, we’ve tried everything.
Dubois returned to the cockpit at 02:11:42 as the
aircraft passed through 35,000 feet, the same altitude
as when he had left the cockpit. In theory, his return
increased the crew’s capacity to resolve the situation,
but he too could not comprehendwhat was happening.
The aircraft’s rate of descent was far beyond the lim-
its envisaged by the designers of the aircraft’s systems
and instruments. As a consequence of this, many read-
ings aggravated the pilots’ difficulties in understand-
ing and responding to their rapidly deteriorating sit-
uation. One example was the “flight directors.” These
display crossbars that prompt the pilots as to which
pitch (up or down) and roll (left or right) inputs they
should make to achieve an intended flight path. Under
normal conditions, the flight directors provide guid-
ance from shortly after takeoff until landing, reduc-
ing the workload of the pilots who would otherwise
have to scan and integrate the readings of several
instruments. However, “It is easy to fall into the trap
of following the flight directors so intently that the
actual instrument indications are ignored” (Palmer
2013, p. 1409). The procedure for unreliable airspeed
indications states that pilots should switch off the flight
directors to avoid erroneous guidance, but the AF447
crew did not do this.
Because of the unreliable airspeed indications, the
flight directors disappeared and reappeared three
times in the 40 seconds following disconnection. Al-
though they initially directed a return to the origi-
nal cruise altitude of 35,000 feet, after a few seconds
they switched to commanding a climb in response to
Bonin’s persistent nose-up inputs. During the four and
a half minutes of the episode the flight directors disap-
peared five times. They displayed for around two min-
utes in total and for at least 75% of this time they com-
manded a climb—the exact opposite of the nose-down
response necessary to recover from the stall. It is not
possible to know if Bonin followed the flight directors,
but Palmer’s analysis of the relationship between the
flight director guidance and Bonin’s actions with the
stick indicate that this is a distinct possibility (Palmer
2013, p. 2338).
The extreme vertical speed of the aircraft had a
number of consequences. Forward airspeed indica-
tions again became unreliable because the angle of
attackwas so steep that the airflow through the sensors
was disrupted. This interacted with another techno-
logical limit. To avoid false stall alarms, the A330’s
aural stall warning is designed to automatically shut
off when the indicated forward airspeed falls below
60 knots, which it did several times because of the rate
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and angle of AF447’s descent. But thismeant that when
the crew twice made correct, nose-down inputs, the
angle of attack reduced, the speed indications became
valid again and the stall warning reactivated. This
may have sent an erroneous cue that the nose-down
inputs were making things worse, rather than better.
The erratic forward speed indications caused by the
rate of descent were also responsible for the disap-
pearance and reappearance of the flight director dis-
plays. Tomakematters even worse, the aircraft’s rate of
descent was so great, and so far outside the design lim-
its of the instruments, that vertical speed indications
also became erratic. Palmer describes the likely scene
on the flight deck:
The crew saw an airplane with operating engines,
pitched up, erratic airspeed, an altimeter moving many
times faster than they have ever seen one move, and
a vertical speed indicator that was blank, erratic, or
pegged beyond the limit of its normal display range.
(Palmer 2013, p. 1903)
Bonin interpreted the stall buffet as a sign that the
aircraft was flying too fast, and reduced the engine
thrust and applied the speed brakes, the exact opposite
of what was required. He was immediately overruled
by Robert.
As the plane passed through 10,000 feet Robert
and Bonin made conflicting inputs via their sidesticks.
A synthetic voice announced “dual input” repeatedly,
warning that twopilotswereattempting tofly theplane:
Robert: Wait, me, I have I have the controls eh?
Synthetic voice: Dual input.
Bonin: What is . . .how come we’re continuing to
go right down now?
. . . .
Bonin: Nine thousand feet.
Dubois: Careful with the rudder bar there.
Robert: Climb, climb, climb, climb.
Bonin: But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while.
Synthetic voice: Dual input.
Dubois: No, no, no, don’t climb.
Robert: So go down.
Synthetic voice: Dual input.
Bonin: Go ahead, you have the controls, we are
still in TOGA [Take Off and Go Around,
i.e., a high power setting] eh?
Synthetic voice: Dual input.
Bonin’s declaration of “But I’ve been at maxi nose-up
for a while” provided the missing piece of the jigsaw
for the other two pilots, as Dubois’ exclamation of “No,
no, no, don’t climb” and Robert’s “So go down” make
clear. But by then there was insufficient altitude left
to recover from the stall. Even after Dubois’ eventual
diagnosis of the situation (around 50 seconds before
impact) and his instructions to Bonin to take corrective
action, Bonin continued to make nose-up inputs that
cancelled out those of Robert, eliciting further warn-
ings of “dual input” from the aircraft’s instruments.
The recording ended at 02:14:28 hours.
Discussion
Aviation is an environment in which limits and limit
violations are relatively visible and in which there are
detailed data on the antecedents and consequences of
violations. We propose that the application of a limits
lens to the loss of AF447 yields several insights.
The first insight concerns the interaction between
aircraft automation and pilots and, more generally,
between exogenous and endogenous limits. A limits
perspective highlights what can happen when con-
sciously designed limits (in this case cockpit automa-
tion) that normally constrain actors from venturing
into a danger zone suddenly disappear. Deprived of
this protection, AF447’s pilots found themselves in a
world that they could not comprehend, exposing their
endogenous, cognition-based limits.
The obstruction of the pitot tubes triggered a rapid
sequence of further limit violations. The pilots, possi-
bly already suffering from degraded collective capacity
to handle disturbance, were abruptly confronted with
a situation that was outside of their normal experience.
Neither was able to make a timely diagnosis; Bonin
aggravated the situation by his inappropriate inputs.
The protections normally afforded by the flight control
system disappeared, probably without the pilots being
fully aware of this. Within a minute the aircraft left
the flight envelope—again, without the pilots realizing
it. Limit violation compounded limit violation as the
behavior of the aircraft exceeded the parameters imag-
ined by its designers, causing the instruments to give
misleading cues to the pilots. Bonin’s individual inca-
pacity to cope quickly developed into collective inca-
pacity as his actions introduced further conditions that
neither Robert nor Dubois could readily diagnose. The
coordination, communication, and cross-checking (col-
lective cognition) that might have allowed stabilization
of the flight path and diagnosis of the problem broke
down, a pattern also observed in other catastrophes
(Weick 1990b, 1993).
The idea that all organizational defenses have holes
and that accidents occur when these holes line up,
often following a triggering event—the “Swiss cheese”
model of failure—is well known (Reason 2000a, 1997).
Limits concepts enrich this model because they high-
light how different elements of a situation may interact
in a cycle of escalation. In the case of AF447, a trig-
gering event, itself a limit violation, occurred. Not only
did this expose holes in defenses as protective exoge-
nous limits fell away, but the situation put unusual
demands on the pilots, exposing and exceeding their
endogenous limits. The pilots then precipitated fur-
ther violations of exogenous limits, such as the stall,
moving events even further beyond their experience
and capabilities. Thus, contagion and destructive spi-
rals occurred as successive limits were breached and
the window for recovery rapidly shrank.
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A second insight from AF447 concerns the chal-
lenge of recognizing where limits actually lie and how
the positions of limits are established. This issue is
graphically illustrated by the icing of AF447’s pitot
tubes, and more generally by the assumed ability of
the overall “human-technical system” to deal with
this eventuality. The limit of the tubes to withstand
ice particle ingestion appears to be a technical ques-
tion. Yet icing of pitot tubes on Airbus aircraft was a
known problem. Nine incidents of unreliable airspeed
indications on A330/A340 aircraft because of icing
were reported by Air France captains alone between
May 2008 and March 2009. Two reports highlighted
the potentially destabilizing nature of these incidents
because of the difficulty of diagnosing them (BEA 2012,
p. 123). Air France reported the issue to Airbus in July
2008, triggering dialogue between Airbus, Air France,
and Thales, the manufacturer of the pitot tubes. Air-
bus’ position was that pilots should follow the unreli-
able airspeed procedure and advised them to “not be
taken by surprise” and to avoid areas where icing was
a risk. Meanwhile, evidence was accumulating that a
newer version of pitot tube was more resistant to icing
than the original model. By April 2009, Air France had
decided to replace all the original pitot tubes fitted to
its long-haul A330/340 fleet as soon as the parts were
available. The first batch of replacement tubes arrived
six days before the loss of AF447 and the first aircraft
was modified shortly after that. AF447 was still fitted
with the original tubes.
The pitot tube issue illustrates how limits are often
not visible andwhen they are, it may only be for a short
period (Farjoun and Starbuck 2007). It also reveals the
complex and subtle processes by which the real, work-
ing limits of complex systemsare establishedandwhy it
maybeverydifficult to ascertain exactlywhere limits lie
until they are tested under multiple and varied condi-
tions—a central argument of normal accident theory
(Perrow 1984). The icing issue had been investigated
and discussed by multiple parties. In a sense the limit
that was being established through this process was
the capability of the “system” (i.e., the combination
of technology, procedures, and pilot intervention) to
cope, safely, with a situation that rarely arose, namely,
icing and loss of speed indications. In the early stages,
neither the problem, which occurred only infrequently,
nor the solution were clearly defined or understood.
Even after it had been decided to replace the original
tubes, the working assumption was that the original
tubes, backed up by pilot intervention that followed
the unreliable airspeed procedure, were sufficient to
ensure safe flight until such time as the new tubes
could be fitted. AF447 demonstrated that this assump-
tion was incorrect and overestimated the capability of
flight crew to act as “disturbance handlers” under all
flying conditions. In effect, the limits of this combined
technical-human system meant that it was unable to
handle the full range of possible conditions that it
might face. This was partly because of the difficulty
of envisaging exactly what these conditions might be,
including the faithful simulation of icing conditions
during design and testing, as well as possible pilot
responses under different conditions. This is a salu-
tary reminder that design and test processes also have
endogenous limits. It can be difficult to foresee all the
possible ways in which technology, organization, and
actors can interact, yet it is precisely these interac-
tions that often determine the real limits of a system’s
capability, particularly in an almost-totally safe system
where many controls are designed in. Studies of catas-
trophes often focus on the cognitive limits of operators
who are confronted with anomalies. An implication of
AF447, based on both pitot tube issue and the behavior
of some of the aircraft instruments as the situation esca-
lated, is that attention to cognitive limits during the
system design and development process is also war-
ranted. Conceptualized through a limits lens, normal
accident theory could be viewed in terms of the cog-
nitive limits of designers, expressed as an inability to
conceive of the full spectrum of interdependencies in a
complex system (Perrow 1984).
The pitot issue raises uncomfortable questions about
the implicit model of management and control that
underpins many complex systems in which designed
limits (such as automation and procedures) do much
of the work of ensuring that the system operates safely,
backed up by human judgment to deal with excep-
tions and anomalies. AF447 demonstrates that a situ-
ation that defeats designed limits is also likely to tax
the capabilities of humans, particularly when (a) these
capabilities have eroded through lack of practice and
(b) humans are caught by surprise and have only a
limited window of time for judgment and response.
Viewed through a limits lens, AF447 demonstrates that
exogenous and endogenous limits can interact in toxic
ways, raising questions about the relationship between
humans and the complex systems that they control.
In aviation, these questions are reflected in loss of con-
trol incidents more widely and it is to these that we
now turn.
The loss of AF447was a loss of control incident, a cat-
egory of accident causing concern in the aviation com-
munity (Belcastro 2012, Belcastro et al. 2014, Brooks
2010, Harris 2011, IATA 2015, Learmount 2011, Plant
and Stanton 2012, RASFOG 2010). Two aspects of the
loss of control problem are particularly relevant to our
discussion of limits, especially the interaction between
exogenous and endogenous limits. These are the diffi-
culty of preparing pilots for rare events and flight deck
automation.
Few pilots ever face the situation in which the pilots
of AF447 found themselves, largely because the limits
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imposed by automation and aviation operating pro-
tocols are so effective at avoiding such a situation in
the first place. Extreme situations are difficult to repro-
duce in a simulated training environment. There are
few data on how commercial aircraft behave in extreme
attitudes on which flight simulator models can be
based. There is also a psychological challenge in repro-
ducing extreme conditions:
The development and acquisition of skills related to
correctly and appropriately responding to the psycho/
physiological reactions inherent in confronting unde-
sirable aircraft states is fundamental to executing a
safe recovery from an unexpected aircraft upset. The
required learning cannot be achieved absent from the
consequences faced in actual flight. (Brooks 2010, p. 8)
AF447 graphically illustrates this point. We cannot
know the precise role of psycho/physiological factors,
but the official report refers repeatedly to Bonin’s anxi-
ety and to the startle effect of the sudden disconnection.
The problem that this highlights is how to develop the
capability to deal with out-of-limit conditions while
staying reasonably safe, i.e., in limits.
A second issue is flight deck automation. The glass
cockpit delivers many benefits but it also subtly dis-
tances pilots from the systems that they oversee and
control, eroding their ability to diagnose and respond
to automation surprises and other unusual conditions.
The glass cockpit enhances safety, but by definition it
means that for most pilots, for most of the time, life
is spent well within the safe flight envelope. Cockpit
automation removes the need for extensive manual fly-
ing, which means that pilots do not have continuous
hands-on experience of aircraft handling under var-
ied conditions. Within the aviation community there
is concern that constant operation within limits causes
a subtle degradation of pilots’ ability to interpret and
respond to situations that lie beyond such limits. This
degradation is not only caused by extensive use of
automation but also hidden by it.
Aviation regulators are taking this issue seriously. In
2013 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued
a safety directive, which notes that “continuous use
of autoflight systems could lead to degradation of the
pilot’s ability to quickly recover the aircraft from an
undesired state” and goes on to state that “Opera-
tional policies should be developed or reviewed to
ensure there are appropriate opportunities for pilots
to exercise manual flying skills . . .during low work-
load conditions” (FAA 2013, p. 1). It is not that flight
deck automation poses risks in normal operations;
on the contrary, it contributes hugely to the impres-
sive safety record of modern commercial aviation. The
problem is more complex than this. As anomalies and
opportunities for error are designed out of a system,
actors have less exposure to rare, extreme events and
less daily, hands-on experience. Consequently, when
unusual events do occur, they may be ill-prepared to
handle them. In limits terms, the application of exoge-
nous limits to regulate load and control variation has
implications for endogenous limits by reducing actors’
cognitive capabilities, both individual and collective,
to deal with variation when it does occur. To make
things worse, this erosion of capabilities may be con-
cealed by the protections that exogenous limits pro-
vide, only to be revealed in rare combinations of con-
ditions. Thus, the very same organizational attributes
that yield safe operation under in-limits conditions
may increase the risk of catastrophe when out-of-
limits conditions are encountered. It is this, we suggest,
that produces a pattern of remarkably safe operation
most of the time, interspersed with occasional, infre-
quent disasters. These, essentially, are the dynamics of
an almost totally safe system (Amalberti 1998, 2001;
Reason 2000b).
If our theory is correct and the paradox of almost
totally safe systems applies, responding to failures by
imposing more stringent exogenous limits is likely to
further degrade the disturbance-handling capability of
actors, unless measures are actively taken to avoid this.
Implications
Our findings carry a number of theoretical and practi-
cal implications for organization science. Chief among
these is the identification of strategies that allow con-
trols to be designed into systems while also developing
and maintaining the disturbance-handling capabilities
of those who operate them. As Starbuck and Farjoun
observed, limits in one form or another underpinmany
organization processes (Farjoun and Starbuck 2007), so
constructing and confronting limits is part and par-
cel of organizational life. Managerially induced lim-
its can be mechanisms to achieve predictability and
control, regulating risks and containing information-
processing loads to manageable levels (Ashby 1958,
Beer 1981, Farjoun and Starbuck 2007, Galbraith 1974,
March 1999, Simon 1982). These limits function to di-
rect and constrain behavior and, as demonstrated by
both NASA and AF447, cognition. By definition, limits
restrict attention and ranges of behavior and therefore
are likely to limit the cognitive capability of actors to
absorb, diagnose, and respond to less familiar contin-
gencies, just as automation on a flight deck restricts
the repertoire of pilots. Inhibition of organizational
intelligence (March 1999) and increased organizational
stupidity (Alvesson and Spicer 2012) therefore follow,
unless compensating actions are taken.
High reliability organizations give some clues as
to what these compensating actions steps might be.
Some of the signature characteristics of high reliability
organizations look very much like antidotes to some
of the dysfunctions of limits, such as “sensitivity to
operations” (“do not lose touch with your system”)
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and “reluctance to simplify” (“do not make too many
compromises in regulating information load”), both
of which could be construed as calls for a balance
between exogenous and endogenous limits (Weick
and Sutcliffe 2007). High reliability organizations may
therefore hold important lessons for other organiza-
tions as they tread a path between developing capa-
bilities and avoiding errors and failure. The parallels
between paradox in safety science and paradox in orga-
nizationsmore widely (Farjoun 2010) are a fruitful area
for further work on limits.
Several practical implications follow from our find-
ings. The first is a reminder of how the controllers of
complex systems, whether they are pilots or executives,
run the risk of becoming insulated from the systems
that they oversee. In the case of pilots, the culprit may
be automation. For executives, it might be separation
from front-line operations, such as when responsibil-
ities are delegated to units who largely follow estab-
lished protocols, resulting in organizational mindless-
ness (Sutcliffe et al. 2016). In short, there are many
organizational equivalents of autopilot. In the field of
management, there is no FAA to advocate more hand-
flying for executives, but the implication is that this is
necessary if executives are to develop andmaintain the
ability to respond appropriately to unusual conditions.
Limitations and Future Research
We chose aviation as our test bed for limits ideas
because limits and limit violations can be readily
observed and because aviation’s intensive recording of
data provides a good foundation for forensic analysis.
However, these features may also limit the generaliz-
ability of aviation-based research.Many organizational
limits are less tangible than those in aviation. Not only
are they harder to see, but social and political forces
mean that exogenous limits are likely to be more mal-
leable, negotiable, and contested than limits defined
by the laws of physics. Taking an aircraft out of the
flight envelope will cause it to fall. Taking an orga-
nization beyond its capability, or violating an exoge-
nous limit set by a regulator (running a bank with very
low capital ratios, for example) does not necessarily
result in disaster. The regulatormay grant a concession,
government may step in with a rescue package, credi-
tors renegotiate terms, and so on. Organizational limits
may be adjusted to accommodate transgressions and
transgressors may escape the consequences of violat-
ing a limit. Thus, while the flight envelope is a powerful
metaphor for the limits of a zone of safe, predictable
operation, there are limits to the analogy. However,
there have been applications of the flight envelope con-
cept in the organization science literature, for example,
in understanding the “survival space” of global auto
firms relative to the capabilities they possess and the
constraints that they face (Holweg and Oliver 2016).
In aviation the consequences of limit violations are
severe and the speed at which events unfold can be
very rapid—the AF447 episode only lasted four and
a half minutes from autopilot disconnection to its
tragic conclusion. Short recovery windows put partic-
ular strain on collective cognition, not only for pilots,
but for system designers and integrators who must
envisage a near-infinite range of conditions. In com-
mon with other environments with limited scope for
trial-and-error learning (Rochlin 1993) the pressure to
design out errors is acute. A limits analysis suggests
that the risk of degradation of actor capabilities is
therefore higher in environments of this nature. Less
safety-critical environments may not experience these
processes so potently.
Future research into limits would benefit from fur-
ther case studies in other safety-critical environments
to see if the interplay between endogenous and exoge-
nous limits seen in aviation is found in other settings.
Investigation of the ways in which organizations that
face volatile and variable conditions not amenable to
procedural solutions develop their people could reveal
a great deal about how disturbance-handling capa-
bility is developed and sustained. Finally, studies of
heroic recoveries as well as disasters could help pin-
point capabilities that contribute to recovery, rather
than dwelling on those whose absence contributed to
disaster.
We hope that through this paper we have conveyed
a sense of what the crew of AF447 faced on the night
of June 1, 2009. For organization science researchers,
AF447 is a salutary reminder of how our capacity as
humans to create highly complex systems is not always
matched by our ability to organize and control them in
the face ofmost conceivable conditions, let alone incon-
ceivable ones. As organizations and systems grow in
scale and complexity, the issue of how we develop
our organizations—and ourselves as actors—to han-
dle unexpected and extreme events grows ever more
pressing.
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Endnotes
1ECAM stands for “Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring.”
This is a display that displays messages about aircraft parameters in
an abbreviated style similar to a text message.
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2Robert’s words were not clear to the transcriber, but he was prob-
ably in the middle of saying “Alternate law—protections lost.”
This was crucial information concerning the loss of flight envelope
protection.
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